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BIOTECHNOLOGY, SUSTAINABILITY & TRUST
Rebecca M. Bratspies*
This paper explores the relationship between technology, trust, and
sustainability. It will focus on the critical role that a particular form of trust-
social trust-plays in helping societies have a genuine conversation about the
many problems they face that are fraught with uncertainty. That role for trust
offers a window into how social trust can be a building block for a more
resilient society and how it can help societies become more sustainable.
Ulrich Beck has written extensively about what he calls the "unseen side
effects of industrial production"' and has explored how those unseen side
effects have "morphed into a profound institutional crisis of industrial society
itself."'2 Now much of the uncertainty and risk that he describes are inherent to
what we think of as modem industrial society. When unceasing technological
innovation forces a constant reassessment of the relationship between scientific
knowledge, technology, and public policy, we are constantly renegotiating this
question of what it means to be sustainable.
Social trust can be a useful framework for evaluating that renegotiation.
More often than we like to acknowledge, society struggles to reconcile its need
for definitive answers with a profound uncertainty about factual and normative
positions. Delay is often an unavailable luxury-there is a need to make a
decision now. These decisions have real, concrete consequences for
individuals. One side prevails in a court case. If it is a bailout, some get the
money, while others do not, and someone has to pay. There are winners and
losers.
The problem is that we make these definite choices against a backdrop of
profound indeterminacy-without enough knowledge to be confident of what
our options are, let alone which option is better. Lacking certainty about what
we know or what we should do, we still have to make these decisions. We
have to marshal our limited stored knowledge and make choices of profound
importance for the present and for the future. This epistemological uncertainty
which is, in many ways, the hallmark of modernity means that such decisions
are always open to challenge.
* Professor of Law, CUNY School of Law.
1. ULRICH BECK ET AL., REFLEXIVE MODERNIZATION: POLITICS, TRADITION AND
AESTHETICS IN THE MODERN SOCIAL ORDER 8 (1994).
2. Id. See also ULRICH BECK, ECOLOGICAL ENLIGHTENMENT: ESSAYS ON THE POLITICS OF
THE RISK SOCIETY 38-40 (Humanities Press 1995).
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So, it begs the question: when government actors make official decisions
in the face of uncertainty, what gives legitimacy to these decisions? This is a
question that we will confront more and more frequently as we struggle with
the problem of global climate change and its ramifications for society in
general. At the same time that we are profoundly altering our environment, we
also have to deal with globalizing markets and new technologies that challenge
the pre-existing political and social fault lines.
As we struggle to keep pace with the accelerating pace of change, we
encounter uncertainty at every turn. Despite, or perhaps because of, this
uncertainty, the world is awash with a host of suggestions for how to regulate
and how to manage. In contexts as diverse as regulating agricultural
biotechnology, approving new drugs, overseeing new financial instruments,
and responding to increased carbon in our atmosphere, the relationship
between trust, uncertainty, and sustainability is constantly being reinterpreted.
The 1987 Bruntland Commission report defined sustainability for the
international community as "meeting the needs of the present without
compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs."3 It is
a pretty good definition, as long as you think about it in not just environmental
terms but also in social and economic terms. Sustainability has three basic
parts: economic, social, and environmental. It does not do us any good to talk
about environmental protection if we are not also talking about the way the
society, as a whole, sustains itself. That people can live; that people have food;
that people have adequate lifestyle; and that social structures support a healthy
and functioning society-these are not just side questions but are integral to
the very idea of sustainability. To tease this out, I want to focus on the
controversy surrounding adoption of agricultural biotechnology in the United
States and around the world. This controversy offers a clear example of how
critical social trust is to creating a regulatory system that remains sustainable
and legitimate in the face of profound social disagreement.
The Cartagena Protocol defines modem biotechnology as "the application
of: (a) in vitro nucleic acid techniques, including recombinant
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) and direct injection of nucleic acid into cells or
organelles, or (b) fusion of cells beyond the taxonomic family, that overcome
natural physiological reproductive or recombination barriers and that are not
techniques used in traditional breeding and selection."4  Notice how the
3. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON FUTURE
42 (1987). A situation is unsustainable when natural capital is depleted more rapidly than it can
be replenished. Thus, at a minimum, sustainability requires that human activity not exceed the
regenerative rate for natural resources and capacities.
4. Cartagena Protocol on Biosafety to the Convention on Biological Diversity, art. 3, 2000,
39 I.L.M. 1027. In limiting its definition to modern biotechnology, the Cartagena Protocol
deliberately narrows the definition ofbiotechnology to exclude traditional processes used to make
beer, cheese, yogurt, and bread. It does so because current public policy disputes do not refer to
these conventional forms of biotechnology but instead refer to modem biotechnology-new and
controversial techniques which involve the transfer of genes between species (genetic
engineering/genetic modification) in a manner and at a speed not previously possible. The
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definition focuses in on specific kinds of technologies. It is a very narrow
definition, and I will come back to that point a little later on.
The success of agricultural biotechnology depends fundamentally on
society's willingness to accept and consume food produced via this
technology. This willingness, in turn, hinges on the level of social trust that
this technology is being developed and used in a safe, sustainable manner.
This needed trust is multifaceted and multilayered. The consumer must trust
that the researchers know what they are doing in developing the crops; that the
companies marketing the crops are operating in a legal and ethical fashion; that
the regulators are exercising proper oversight; that the farmers are obeying
these regulations; and that all parties involved are not lying to the public. That
is a lot of trust to have in quite a few distinct sets of actors. As you can see,
trust, in this context, involves a nested hierarchy of factors relating to
individual perceptions, specific situational and institutional contexts, and
general societal relationships. Because there are so many parties involved and
so many interrelationships, there are a lot of opportunities for the needed trust
to break down.
Attempts to control the outcome of the discourse about agricultural
biotechnology focus heavily on normalizing the framework within which the
discourse takes place. The technology's purveyors argue that the technology
should be considered in light of its potential to provide substantial agricultural
productivity gains while reducing the carbon footprint and environmental
stresses associated with agriculture. This frame keeps attention focused on the
particular attributes of the technology and shunts aside broader questions about
social choices embedded in the technology's adoption. But, that is not the only
possible framework for examining the technology. Other possible frames
include examining the technology in the context of a broader discussion of
ecological or public health or through a frame that highlights the power
dynamics of corporate ownership of the food supply or even through a frame
that emphasizes the moral and ethical concerns over altering genetic codes.
All of these framing options offer legitimate lenses through which to consider
the technology-though each is likely to take the discourse down a very
different path. All are in play at the same time. Each alternative frame has
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (OECD) and the Food and
Agricultural Organization of the United Nations (FAO) use a slightly different definition. See
Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development, Definition of Biotechnology,
http://www.oecd.org/document/42/0,3343,en_2649-34537_1933994_1_1_1_37437,00.html (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009); Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Biotechnology,
http://www.fao.org/biotech/spec-term-n.asp?id-glo-472 l&idjlang=TERM SE&lang=en (last
visited Mar. 25, 2009). The United States defines biotechnology as "the use of modern scientific
techniques, including genetic engineering, to improve or modify plants, animals, and
microorganisms." U.S. Department of State, Biotechnology Fact Sheet,
http://www.lifesciencesnetwork.com/repository/education/what is-biotech.htm (last visited Apr.
25, 2009); U.S. Department of State, Glossary of Biotechnology,
http://usinfo.state.gov/joumals/ites/0903/ ijee/glossary.htm; United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), Agricultural Biotechnology: Glossary,
http://www.ers.usda.gov/briefing/biotechnology/glossary.htm.
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advocates who are trying to shape the contours of the discourse.
One relatively successful tactic in this contest over framing has been the
attempt to normalize the technology itself For that reason, proponents of
agricultural biotechnology are fond of comparing modem corn with its closest
wild relative, teosinte, and pointing out that dramatic human intervention was
necessary to get us from there to here.5 This observation is certainly accurate
but whether it is useful is less clear. Related attempts to point out that human
beings have been making bread for millennia and to characterize the process as
involving "yeast-mediated biotechnology," 6 although factually true, are simply
not responsive to the social concerns that animate the alternative frames for
considering this particular technology.
The kinds of uncertainty that surround this technology cannot be tamed by
superficial analogies or by statistical techniques. Imperfections in risk
assessment and in social analysis make this area ripe for the kinds of distrust
that undermine the legitimacy of decision-making. Even more fundamentally,
there are large segments of society that feel excluded from the decision process
and disempowered and ignored in the regulatory approval process. When
advocates rely on normalization tactics to ignore these concerns, that tactic
only underscores the desire to invoke alternative frames. The questions
surrounding this technology are inextricably entwined with the reality that we
live in a profoundly unequal world with differential accesses to power and
resources. Ultimately, the question of who will allocate how much risk to
whom and under what circumstances, a question embedded in the dispute over
agricultural biotechnology, implicates fundamental questions of democratic
decision-making and equality. Brushing those questions aside with glib
analogies is not a recipe for trust. Nor can we move beyond polarization until
people feel that their points of view have been heard and considered.
So to understand what needs to be done, we need to start by identifying
the kinds and levels of trust that already exist with regard to this technology.
Pew Research conducted a survey about who the public trusts with regard to
biotechnology. 7  Thirty-seven percent of consumers trust their friends and
families a great deal as sources of information about biotechnology. 8 This was
5. Nina V. Fedoroff, Prehistoric GM Corn, 302 SCI. 1158, 1158 (2003); Svante Paibo,
Neolithic Genetic Engineering, 398 NATURE 194, 195 (1999) (describing neolithic genetic
manipulation of corn).
6. For fairly typical examples of this characterization from a range of sources including an
industry trade group, see, e.g., Biotechnology Industry Organization, Food Biotechnology,
http://www.bio.org/speeches/pubs/er/food.asp (offering the conventional position of the
biotechnology industry); ORGANISATION FOR ECONOMIC Co-OPERATION & DEVELOPMENT,
RECOMBINANT DNA SAFETY CONSIDERATIONS 12 (1986), available at
http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/43/34/40986855.pdf; D. Boulter, Plant Biotechnology: Facts and
Public Perception, 40 PHYTOCHEMISTRY 1 (1995).
7. See Memorandum from The Mellman Group, Inc. to The Pew Initiative on Food and
Biotechnology (Nov. 16, 2006), available at
http://www.pewtrusts.org/uploadedFiles/wwwpewtrustsorgPublic-Opinion/Food-andBiotechno
logy/2006summary.pdf.
8. Id. at 6-7.
2009]REBECCA BRA TSPIES: BIOTECHNOLOGY, SUSTAINABILITY 277
the highest percentage for any group or any organization listed in the survey.
Farmers were next, followed by scientists and academics, and then the Food
and Drug Administration (FDA). 9 Notice who is at the bottom of the trust pile:
the news media, biotechnology companies, food manufacturers, and
government regulators.' 0 The reason I find this chart so interesting is that the
Pew Center had conducted a similar survey a couple of years earlier. At the
time, in 2001, the FDA had been the most trusted institution." Forty-one
percent of people surveyed in 2001 said they trusted the FDA a great deal
when it came to genetically-modified food.12 A lot has happened since 2001,
much of it not very good for the reputation of the FDA.13 Its trustworthiness
rating has declined significantly, and there is a lesson there: trust is fragile; it
can be easily destroyed. Once trust is broken it is very difficult to reestablish.
At this point, it is worth taking a step back and asking the big picture
question: what do I mean by trust? Part of the work I have been doing lately is
trying to figure out an answer to this question. As I see it, the ways we think
about trust can be grouped into three distinct approaches based on the
characteristics of the trust relationship involved. Those approaches are: thick
trust, calculative self-interest, and social trust.' 4  Thick trust is the idea of
social capital based on kinship or other personal relationships. Calculative
self-interest, which comes from game theory, focuses on rational value-
maximizing individual behavior. Then there is this idea of social trust-
impersonal trust rooted in social structures that facilitate interactions between
strangers. It is important to understand what exactly we are talking about
when we talk about trust because these three trust theories lead us in very
different directions.
My suggestion is that institutions that are deliberately structured to
nurture and support social trust may be able to scale hurdles that otherwise
seem insurmountable. Organizational studies tell us that trust is correlated
with the ability to accept unfavorable decisions, particularly those deviating
from one's normative preferences.15 If so, identifying what makes for stronger
9. Id.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 7.
12. Id.
13. See e.g., Anahad O'Conner, Vioxx. Celebrex. Now Aleve. What's a Patient to Think?,
N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 8, 2004), at F5 (noting the corrosive effects on trust in the FDA); Press
Release, U.S. Food & Drug Administration, FDA Announces Series of Changes to the Class of
Marketed Non-Steroidal Anti-Inflamatory Drugs (NSAIDs) (Apr. 7, 2005), available at
http://www.fda.gov/bbs/topics/news/2005/NEW01171.html; FDA, Merck and Vioxx: Putting
Patient Safety First? Before the S. Comm. on Finance, 108th Cong. (2004) (testimony of Dr.
David J. Graham) available at
http://finance.senate.gov/hearings/testimony/2004test/I II 804dgtest.pdf.
14. I have explored these varying conceptions of trust elsewhere. See Rebecca Bratspies,
Regulatory Trust 51 ARIz. L. REv. 555 (forthcoming Fall 2009).
15. See Eric M. Uslaner, Democracy and Social Capital, in DEMOCRACY AND TRUST 122
(Mark E. Warren, ed. 1999); Joel Brockner et al., When Trust Matters: The Moderating Effect of
Outcome Favorability, 42 ADMIN. SCI. Q. 558 (1997).
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bonds of social trust is a critical first step toward a new way of organizing
regulatory decision-making. With this understanding, we can begin to
cultivate the reservoir of social trust needed to allow regulatory agencies to
govern effectively in the face of fundamental uncertainty.
First, I will mention very briefly thick trust. This is when cooperative
actions occur wholly between persons of known dispositions and character.
Thick trust shows up in the Pew Survey about agricultural biotechnology as the
strongest form of trust with regard to information concerning GMOs. Many
traditional societies function on the basis of thick trust. A precondition of a
society based on thick trust seems to be a small, tightly knit, homogenous
society. When every individual's identity is bound up with group membership,
thick trust within the group can be a powerful force for organizing and
maintaining society. Once the conceptualization of the individual as a unique
and isolated unit takes hold, however, thick trust becomes very difficult to
maintain. As societies become more complex, with stark divisions of labor
and increased interactions with strangers, the social bonds that make thick trust
possible weaken. Such societies need to find a new means for facilitating
trusting interactions. As an example, we are wholly dependent on the skill and
care employed, or at least we hope employed, by the anonymous engineers of
the subways we ride, the manufacturers of the medicine we take, and the
workers who assemble the various things we rely on, including child safety
seats. We have little chance of meeting these individuals, and we do not
interact with them on the basis of any individual relationship that might lead to
thick trust.
Our inability to rely on thick trust in these relationships does not mean
that we cannot repose trust in those fulfilling those roles, but it does mean we
have to find a different way, other grounds, for trusting. For these kinds of
interactions, the confidence to trust arises from the context in which the action
occurs rather that from the attributes of a specific trusted individual.' 6
Individuals are embedded in social systems, with rules and resources that
powerfully constrain or enable individual interactions. Although certainly
aspects of these social systems are powerfully influenced by "thick trust," they
depend much more heavily on what Luhmann called "system trust" 17 than on
interpersonal trust. It is precisely this kind of trust that is absent in the context
of agricultural biotechnology. Indeed, the fight over agricultural biotechnology
highlights the problems with relying on thick trust to respond to complex
social issues calling for social trust. The developers, manufacturers and
adopters of the technology are strangers to most of those making decisions
16. However, the Pew Data cited above suggests that when that context fails, many people
retreat into thick trust. Hence the change from trusting FDA to trusting one's family and friends
with regard to information about genetically-modified foods. See Memorandum from The
Mellman Group, Inc., supra note 7.
17. NIKLAS LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER (Wiley & Sons 1979) [hereinafter LUHMANN,
TRUST AND POWER]; see also Niklas Luhmann, Familiarity, Confidence, Trust: Problems and
Alternatives, in TRUST: MAKING AND BREAKING COOPERATIVE RELATIONS 97 (Diego Gambetta,
ed., Blackwell 2000).
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about whether they think the technology is trustworthy. Those with whom the
general public has thick trust relationships (each other) generally have little or
no direct knowledge upon which to form an opinion. Thus we wind up with an
echo chamber in which like-minded individuals reinforce their initial beliefs,
and society grows more and more polarized. What is needed is not more thick
trust, but a credible regulatory system capable of inspiring trust across society
as a whole.
The neo-conservative take on this move from thick trust to social trust
tends to be one of lamentation. Many of you may have read Robert Putnam's
work Bowling Alone 18 or Francis Fukuyama's book Trust.19 Both are pretty
much jeremiads bemoaning the loss of thick trust in society. Both thinkers
conflate thick trust with social trust and offer a vision of trust that places the
entire burden for making society work onto voluntary associations and
traditional family membership. In doing so, they elide the central challenge of
modernity, which is the complexity and anonymity of the urban, industrial
existence.
As society changes and becomes more complex, thick trust is no longer
the main source of knowledge about those who are to be trusted and, by
corollary, can no longer be the principal means of assessing trustworthiness. A
new way to grease the wheel of social interaction becomes necessary. It seems
to me there are two basic responses to this problem: rejection of the need of
trust in favor of relying on calculative self-interest or, in the alternative, the
invocation of social, rather than inter-personal trust.
So now we turn to calculative self interest and the prisoner's dilemma.2 0
This is one of the ways that game theory insights about trust have influenced
law. The prisoner's dilemma starts from the premise that individuals "are
motivated to maximize their personal gains and minimize their personal losses
in social interactions. ' '21 If you start from that position, you must first assume
that all individuals already know what counts as a personal gain as opposed to
a personal loss. Having made this (unrealistic) assumption, rational choice
theorists posit that most social interactions can be explained through a self-
interested instrumental lens. 22 The classic iteration of the prisoner's dilemma
18. ROBERT D. PUTNAM, BOWLING ALONE: THE COLLAPSE AND REVIVAL OF AMERICAN
COMMUNITY (Simon & Schuster 2000).
19. FRANCIS FUKUYAMA, TRUST: THE SOCIAL VIRTUES AND THE CREATION OF
PROSPERITY 23-41 (1995).
20. Merrill Flood and Melvin Dresher first posited the Prisoner's Dilemma in 1950. Their
work was formalized and popularized by Albert Tucker, who gave it the name "Prisoner's
Dilemma." For a brief historical overview of the evolution of game theory, see Phillip D.
Straffin, Jr., Changing the Way We Think About the Social World, 14 TwO-YEAR COLLEGE
MATHEMATICS J. 228 (1983). For an in-depth description of game theory's birth, see WILLIAM
POUNDSTONE, PRISONER'S DILEMMA (Anchor Books 1992).
21. RODERICK MORELAND KRAMER & TOM R.TYLER, TRUST IN ORGANIZATIONS:
FRONTIERS OF THEORY AND RESEARCH 1 (1995).
22. There is a vast literature on rational choice theory. Some of the best known
introductions include: JAMES S. COLEMAN, FOUNDATIONS OF SOCIAL THEORY (Harvard Univ.
Press 1990); ROBERT ALEXROD, THE EVOLUTION OF COOPERATION (Basic Books 1984); Russell
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involves two prisoners arrested for some unspecified crime. The police do not
have enough evidence to actually convict them, so they separate the prisoners
and speak with them separately. They tell each prisoner "if you confess and
agree to testify against your buddy and we convict your buddy, you go free and
he gets a longer sentence." But, they are offering the buddy the same deal. If
the two both agree to testify against each other, they will both get a moderate,
but still lengthy sentence. If neither agrees to cooperate, the police have
enough evidence to convict only on a minor charge.
For each prisoner, the game presumes the best individual result is attained
by betraying another's confidence. The best overall result is attained by both
prisoners remaining silent. But, a prisoner who remains silent while his or her
accomplice defects is in the worst situation. Although the ultimate outcome
depends on collective choices made by the accomplices, each one must choose
without knowing what his or her accomplice has chosen. That is the
'dilemma' part of the game.
The game highlights the role of lack of trust poses for coordination under
conditions of uncertainty, because prisoners, as a class, are better off if they
can trust their accomplices. Individual prisoners are better off if they betray an
accomplice who trusts them. Trust, or its absence, shapes which choice is
rational. It makes no sense to remain silent, a choice that might make the
player into the game's sucker, unless players trust one another.
There are clearly some lessons from game theory that resonate in any
discussion of regulatory trust. But extrapolations from theory to the world
must be done very cautiously. First of all, even in the highly artificial world of
a game theory experiment, cooperation occurs. Researchers have run countless
experiments testing various versions of the prisoner's dilemma game. It turns
out that subjects in these games actually display much more trusting behavior
than the theory suggests. 23 Second, individuals acting to maximize their own
collective rational interest may undermine the collective good.24
There are other factors that limit the usefulness of these games. First of
all, in the real world there are well-documented cases of false confession-not
an issue in the game but of significant concern for a system based on justice.
Moreover, disconnects between results in the game and results in the real
world stem at least in part from the artificialities of the game. The players are
subject to no enduring consequences for their choices, have no ties of loyalty,
fear or love to anyone else in the game, and participate only for a limited
Hardin, The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust, 21 POL. & SOc'Y 505 (1993).
23. See e.g., Luca Crudeli et al., Social Capital or Economic Rents? An Experimental Study,
20 RATIONALITY & Soc'Y 311, 321-30 (2008); Harvey S. James, Jr., The Trust Paradox: A
Survey of Economic Inquiries into the Nature of Trust and Trustworthiness, 47 J. ECON. BEHAV.
& ORG. 291, 305-07 (2002); Kiyonari et al., Social Exchange and Reciprocity: Confusion or
Heuristic? 21 EVOLUTION & HUM. BEHAV. 411, 421-27 (2000); Nahoko Hayashi et al.,
Reciprocity, Trust and the Sense of Control, 11 RATIONALITY & SOc'Y 27, 35-40 (1999); see
generally Dean G. Pruitt & Melvin J. Kimmel, Twenty Years of Experimental Gaming: Critique,
Synthesis and Suggestions for the Future, 28 ANN. REV. PSYCHOL. 363 (1977).
24. Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968).
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period of time.25 And, of course, in the world as opposed to the game, it is not
always obvious whether someone has acted cooperatively or has defected, nor
do games people play outside the laboratory have any clear endpoints or limits.
These critiques are methodological. But, I think there is a more
fundamental problem with the whole line of analysis: it conflates trust with
cooperation. 26  This makes the analysis both over-inclusive and under-
inclusive because there can be trust that does not manifest itself in cooperation
and there can also be cooperation without trust. This theory does not really
have a way to account for that problem, nor can it distinguish between trust-
based cooperation and cooperation driven by other concerns, like fear.
That brings us to the third option-social trust. This vision of trust is
premised on the insight that there are scarcely any activities in modem society
that do not require the social collaboration of human beings who are unknown
to each other.27 As a result, the trust necessary for social coordination must be
institutional rather than intimate. Bernard Barber2 8 and Niklas Luhmann, 29 two
sociologists, have written some of the definitive works on this topic.
According to these thinkers, social trust has some critical components. First of
all, there is a shared set of background expectations. This is a very general
principle, not necessarily specific shared values so much as a shared way of
interacting. Another sociologist, Harold Garfinkel did a very interesting set of
breaching experiments that demonstrated this point.3" Garfinkel had his
students breach the expected social norms with the people they interact with.
For example, he asked his students to treat their families like strangers. 31 In
these breaching experiments, social interactions simply did not go down the
path people expected. The result was great stress for the students and great
anger on the part of everyone else.
25. More realistic versions of the game cure some but not all of these evils. The iterated
prisoner's dilemma, for example, where the players have repeat interactions, induces more
cooperation.
26. The analytical model has no way of distinguishing cooperation that occurs despite lack
of trust from trust-based cooperation, nor can it distinguish a decision not to cooperate despite
trusting with a refusal to cooperate based on lack of trust. These problems are inherent to an
experimental model that treats trust and cooperation as interchangeable. For an exploration of
these points, see Toshio Yamagishi et al., Separating Trust from Cooperation, 17 RATIONALITY
& SOC'Y 275-76 (2005).
27. See Kenneth Newton, Social and Political Trust, in OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL
BEHAVIOR 342 (Russell J. Dalton & Hans-Dieter Klingemann eds., 2007).
28. See BERNARD BARBER, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF TRUST (1983).
29. See LUHMANN, TRUST AND POWER, supra note 17.
30. See Harold Garfinkel, Studies of the Routine Grounds of Everyday Activities, 11 SOCIAL
PROBS. 225 (1964).
31. In some of these experiments, Garfinkel had students try to pay more than the price for
an item at a store, shop by taking items from the grocery carts of others, and change the rules of
tic-tac-toe mid-game. He used these experiments to demonstrate the existence of an unspoken set
of assumptions about the course of everyday interactions, what he called a "common moral order
of the facts of collective life." Id. at 242. His work showed that disruption of these expectations
caused extreme distress, anger and anxiety. Id. at 245.
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Expectations of technically competent role-performance are a second,
very important component of social trust. We expect that people can do what
they are supposed to do and that they can do it reasonably well. We also have
expectations that people live up to their responsibilities and act on them.
Anthony Giddons has written about how this aspect of trust is a "reflexive"
phenomenon. 32 As he describes it, social interactions give rise to trust, which
creates the possibility of further social actions which further build trust and so
on.
What does this have to do with agricultural biotechnology? The
realization of all the exciting potential embodied in this technology will not
happen unless we have a comprehensive and scientifically rigorous regulatory
system that adequately addresses environmental and human health issues, and
does so in a way that is credible to the public. In other words, the bitter
controversy will continue until and unless the public trusts in the social, as well
as environmental sustainability of agricultural biotechnology. That needed
trust is necessarily entwined with broader questions about the role that a
trustworthy regulatory system plays in creating a sustainable society and
ensuring responsible use of this, and other, new technologies. We do not
currently have such a regulatory system, to our detriment. Protecting the
public's interest in this context will require government to assume a far more
active role than the hands-off attitude that has been the hallmark of
conventional agricultural policy.
An exploration of these components of trust-shared social expectations,
competence, and legitimacy cast some light on the questions we will need to
ask about this technology in order to build social trust going forward. That
means going beyond the narrow framing of agricultural biotechnology as a
wholly technical question offered by its proponents. We still need to ask all
the questions that currently get explored in the regulatory process. But we
need to expand the regulatory conversation to include the broad-based
questions posed by other frames for viewing the technology. These questions,
raised far less often in regulatory proceedings, are vital for assessing the future
viability of this technology. While the former set of questions focuses on the
details of the particular technology, the latter ask what kind of society we want.
The narrow question-the safe use of the particular technology-is really
a series of questions about regulatory competency. But questions about
whether a regulation has been competently implemented are not the only
questions worth asking. There are also questions about legitimacy-about how
this technology fits into a broader social policy and whether its adoption
further a collective vision of the social good.
I am emphasizing these different sets of questions because they are at the
heart of the debate over biotechnology. Because they approach the questions
through different frameworks, some groups suggest that only the technical
32. Anthony Giddons, Risk, Trust, Reflexivity, in BECK ET AL., REFLEXIVE
MODERNIZATION, supra note 1, at 184.
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questions are legitimately part of the regulatory discourse, while other groups
will never end their opposition until the conversation expands to include the
legitimacy questions. This is not a situation in which the concerns, values, and
priorities emphasized by one group are legitimate while those emphasized by
the others are not. It is instead a situation in which different groups are
focused on very different issues. To resolve this problem, we must consider
competency and legitimacy as part of an assessment of the technical questions.
We will start with technical competency. Are regulators up to the task?
Bundled within this question is a series of other, more specific questions: do
we have confidence the regulators have asked the right questions, considered
data in a reasonable manner, and reached logical conclusions? In terms of
competence, regulation of this technology did not get off to the best start. The
familiar litany of scandals surrounding discovery of unapproved GM crops in
food, most spectacularly the StarLink Corn33 and Prodigene 34 fiascos, suggests
there may be good reason to worry that regulators have not fully considered
many of the possible problems that the technology might create. And these
were not the only instances where unapproved crops contaminated crops
intended for use as food. 35 All these failures to properly contain unapproved
GM crops raise serious questions about competency: about industry's
commitment to and competence in stewardship, and about the adequacy and
competence of regulatory oversight. These scandals raise fundamental
questions about the competence of the overall regulatory process-a question
that goes far beyond the legitimacy of any particular regulatory decision.
Recent court decisions underscore these doubts about basic competency.
36
33. For a full discussion of the StarLink corn contamination incident, see Rebecca M.
Bratspies, Myths of Voluntary Compliance: Lessons from the StarLink Corn Fiasco, 27 WM. &
MARY ENVTL. L. & POL'Y REv. 593, 605 (2003).
34. See Rebecca M. Bratspies, Consuming (F)ears of Corn: Public Health and
Biopharming, 30 AM. J. L. & MED. 371, 389-90 (2004).
35. In 2005, Syngenta reported sale of unapproved Btl0 corn. See e.g., Press Release,
European Comm'n, Bt 10: EU Requires Certification of U.S. Exports to Stop Unauthorised
GMO from Entering EU (Apr. 15, 2005) (reporting on the illegal presence of Bt 10, an
unapproved GM corn, in shipments received in the EU), available at
http://www.eurunion.org/news/press/2005/2005038.htm; Press Release, U.S. Envtl. Prot.
Agency, EPA Fines Syngenta $1.5 Million for Distributing Unregistered Genetically Engineered
Pesticide (Dec. 21, 2006), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/e987e762f557727d852570bc0042cc90/2df47c51 f639b
e4e8525724b0069655c!OpenDocument; Colin Macilwain, U.S. Launches Probe into Sales of
Unapproved Transgenic Corn, 434 NATURE 423 (2005). The next year, unapproved GM rice was
discovered in food shipments sent to the European Union. See European Union, Proportionate
EU Measures Taken Against Illegal US GM Rice Imports, (Aug 26, 2006)
http://www.eurunion.org/eu/index2.php?option=com_content&do-pdf-l&id=2852; Food and
Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Contaminated Rice Flows to Global Market
(Feb. 18, 2007) http://agriculturenews.net/index.aspx?Type=Briefnews&ID=2386 (reporting on
the contamination of conventional rice destined in part for export markets with Bayer's
unapproved Liberty Link 601 Rice); John Henry, Tainted Rice Testing State Farmers' Trust:
Bioengineered Variety Threatens Finances, ARK. BUS., Dec.4, 2006, at 1; Europe Warns on Rice
from U.S., INT'L HERALD TRIB., Sept. 22, 2006, at 16.
36. Geertson Seed Farms v. Johanns, No. C 06-01075, 2007 WL 518624 (N.D. Cal. 2007)
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There are some other concerns that are worth mentioning for whatever
light they shed on assumptions about competent regulatory activities. First is a
concern that surfaced about a year ago about the unanticipated effect of Bt crop
residues on aquatic insects. 37 Now, much of the regulatory regime around Bt
crops was based on assumptions about the way corn pollen behaves.38 Those
assumptions are at least fairly good. While there is an ongoing argument about
whether the regulatory assumptions fully capture the potential for transgenic
pollen to spread into nearby fields or to pollinate related plants, we know a lot
about corn pollen, including how far the pollen travels on average. The
problem is that the regulators assumed in approving GM corn that pollen is the
only part of the plant that travels. It turns out that corn detritus, the leaves and
stalks, can also wind up traveling considerable distances, particularly after big
storms.39 Much of that detritus winds up in streams, where it and the pollen it
contains may affect aquatic organisms. 40 This possibility was not considered
at all in the regulatory process. There are also concerns about the possible
release of Bt toxins into the soil,41 and some research has raised the possibility
of horizontal transfer of Bt resistance to soil bacteria.42 I am not saying that
these things are happening, but I am saying they are questions that have been
raised in the scientific literature for a decade without really being considered in
the regulatory process; that is a problem.
That brings us to the issue of legitimacy. Do we have confidence that
regulators are acting honestly and in the public's interest? Some recent events
raise questions. I have already mentioned the recent scandals involving the
FDA, and there have also certainly been a lot of revelations about problems
with regulatory oversight of the financial markets. We also have also seen, in
the past eight years, far too much political interference with science. One of
the more egregious examples is political appointee Philip A. Cooney's decision
to substantively edit scientific reports about global warming, despite having no
(describing USDA as "cavalier" in its failure to conduct an Environmental Impact Assessment
before approving GM alfalfa); Int'l Center for Tech. Assessment v. Johanns, 473 F. Supp.2d 9
(D.D.C. 2007) (permanently enjoining USDA from conducting field tests on GM creeping
bentgrass until and unless it performs appropriate environmental assessments).
37. Thomas Bohn et al., Reduced Fitness of Daphnia magna Fed a Bt-Transgenic Maize
Variety, 55 ARCHIVES ENVTL. CONTAMINATION & TOXICOLOGY 584 (2008). E.J. Rossi-
Marshall et al., Toxins in Transgenic Crop Byproducts May Affect Headwater Stream
Ecosystems, 104 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 16204 (2007).
38. For a discussion of some of these assumptions, see Rebecca M. Bratspies, The Illusion
of Care: Regulation, Uncertainty, and Genetically Modified Food Crops, 10 N.Y.U. ENVTL. L.J.
297, 312 (2002).
39. E.J. Rossi-Marshall, et al., supra note 37, at 16204.
40. Id.
41. Isik Icoz & Guenther Stotzky, Fate and Effects of Insect Resistant Bt Crops on Soil
Ecosystems, 40 SOIL BIOLOGY. & BIOCHEMISTRY 559 (2008) (surveying conflicting studies);
Deepak Saxena et al., Insecticidal Toxin in Root Exudates from Bt Corn, 402 NATURE 480
(1999).
42. Sandrine Demanche et al., Antibiotic-resistant Soil Bacteria in Transgenic Plant
Fields, 105 PROC. NAT'L ACAD. SCI. 3957 (2008).
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scientific expertise and a clear conflict of interest.4 3 Unfortunately, that is only
one example among many.
At the same time, the mismatch between the rhetoric and the crops that
are actually being developed further raises questions about legitimacy.
Supporters of agricultural biotechnology like to talk about golden rice' and to
point out the potential for agricultural biotechnology to address food insecurity
in a world where one in five people does not have enough to eat.
Unfortunately, the rhetoric does not match the reality of these crops. Golden
rice is a wonderful idea but has yet to live up to its promise.4 5 And where are
the other crops targeted at the world's malnourished and hungry? What we
have gotten so far is crops that grow better and more profitably in Iowa and
wind up feeding cattle. This mismatch between rhetoric and reality does
nothing to cultivate trust. Instead it offers support to those who assert that the
public is being manipulated and lied to.
I am not saying that it is bad to have crops that can be grown more
profitably in Iowa, but I am saying that trying to justify the existing uses of this
technology based on saving the world creates a disconnect. Most transgenic
crops have been developed (and patented) by multi-national corporations to
address production constraints in the wealthy and developed world. Private
research has focused on traits like herbicide resistance that offer lucrative tie-in
opportunities and are best suited for large-scale commercial farming. The
needs of small-scale and subsistence farmers are not served by these
innovations. That is not to say that the technology might not yet save the
world. Indeed, what I want to talk about next what its potential are to do just
that and how this dialogue about agricultural biotechnology needs to be
changed to make that outcome more likely.
If it all comes down to regulatory trust, and I think it does, we also have
to ask the question of what will the consequences be in places without the
capacity to effectively regulate these technologies, because there are a lot of
them. Not only are there a lot of places without the capacity to regulate these
technologies, but the United States regulatory system discounts the relevance
of those questions for regulatory approval within the United States. This is
important to remember. Even though successful use in the United States is
offered as evidence of the safety of an agricultural biotechnology, the United
States regulatory process explicitly brackets the question of what might happen
in other places, particularly in centers of origin. It makes little sense under
43. Andrew C. Revkin, Bush Aide Softened Greenhouse Gas Links to Global Warming,
NYTIMES, June 8, 2005. Mr. Toomey, a lawyer with no scientific training, had previously
worked for the American Petroleum Institute in their campaign to prevent restrictions on
greenhouse gas emissions.
44. Madaleine Nash, Grains of Hope, TIME (Asia ed.), Feb. 7, 2001, available at
http://www.biotech-info.net/hope.html; see Mary Lou Guerinot, The Green Revolution Strikes
Gold, 287 SC. 241 (2000).
45. Alex Kirby, BBC News Online, 'Mirage' of GM's Golden Promise, Feb. 2004,
http://www.biotech-info.net/mirage-of.promise.html; Michael Pollan, The Great Yellow Hype,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 4, 2001.
286 KANSAS JOURNAL OF LA W & PUBLIC POLICY[Vol. XVIII:2
these circumstances to point to United States' regulatory approval as an
argument for demonstrated safety in general.
Given the narrow scope of United States regulatory consideration,
successful use in the United States does not necessarily provide any
information about what might happen elsewhere. Unfortunately, it is likely that
we will see the technology spreading across the world without any
consideration of the unique consequences in particular places. We live in a
globalized world. Things travel. As a result, "a release anywhere is a release
everywhere. 46 Now, that fact is not, in itself, an argument for not doing
something, but it does mean that the consequences of mistakes are potentially
really high.
At the same time, there is a compelling need to do something about
hunger. One in five people on this planet suffers from food insecurity.47 That
is more than a billion people; despite efforts to achieve the Millennium
Development Goal of halving world hunger by 2015,48 the number is not
shrinking much. Climate change is going to compromise food production even
more, and the world's population is expected to exceed nine billion by 2050.
49
That is a very large number of people, and it will take a lot of food if we are
going to feed them adequately-and I think we have an obligation to do that.
That means thinking carefully about new technologies and trying to figure
out how they can be used to alleviate poverty and hunger. To that end, I want
to talk about what happened with Bt corn in Kenya, because there are some
lessons that will be important going forward.Com borers infect a vast portion
of the African corn crop and cause significant damage. 50 This damage often
causes crop loss for subsistence farmers who are already marginalized. 51 The
problem is tremendous, and Bt corn might have really helped these farmers.
But, Bt corn trials in Kenya faced two problems: 1) the trials were poorly
managed; and 2) concern over patent rights created uncertainty.52 On the first
problem, there were a number of scandals involving the Kenya trials53 that
46. Thomas Lumpkin, personal communication with the author (Oct. 2008).
47. See FOOD & AGRIC. ORG. OF THE UNITED NATIONS, THE STATE OF FOOD INSECURITY
IN THE WORLD 2008 [hereinafter FAO], available at
http://www.fao.org/docrep/011 /i0291 e/i0291 e00.htm.
48. United Nations, Millennium Development Goals,
http://www.un.org/millenniumgoals/poverty.shtml (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
49. U.S. Census Bureau, International Database: World Population: 1950-2050,
http://www.census.gov/ipc/www/idb/worldpopgraph.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2009). See FAO,
supra note 47.
50. Stephen Mugo et al., Developing Bt Maize for Resource-poor Farmers-Recent
Advances in the IRMA Project, 4 AFR. J. BIOTECHNOLOGY 1490, 1497-1499 (2003), available at
http://www.academicjournals.org/AJB/PDF/Pdf2005/Spe%2Rev/Mugo%20et%20al.pdf.
51. Id. at 1499-1500.
52. Kenya Stops Research on Maize, SUNDAY NATION (Aug. 25, 2005) (describing what
went wrong with the field trials.); Mugo, et al, supra note 50 at 1494 (describing the IP
uncertainties); see also Deborah Delmer, Road Bumps and Pitfalls for Agricultural
Biotechnology, 54-55, http://nabc.cals.comell.edu/pubs/nabc_ 8/NABC 18_Delmer.pdf.
53. Ochieng Ogodo, Islam Online, GMOs or Safety (Nov. 23, 2005), available at
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decreased whatever public trust there might have been in this technology (and
there probably was not that much to begin with). The second meant that, even
though the relevant technology could no longer be patented in Kenya,
researchers had a hard time establishing the needed freedom to operate.5 4 They
obtained Bt genes from the University of Ottawa under a research license.
When it came time to develop crops for distribution, the University got cold
feet because of uncertainty over the liability consequences elsewhere.55 The
University was concerned about its potential liability for patent infringement
because the genes are patented in Canada. Even though there is no patent on
the relevant Bt gene in Kenya, and thus there could not be a patent
infringement issue in Kenya, 56 the researchers were forced to contact the
holders of intellectual property rights in other countries to beg for explicit
permission to use materials in Kenya that were not subject to patent protection
in Kenya! 57 So, this project has yet to provide any Bt corn to resource poor
farmers. This was a real failure, and it was also a public relations black eye.
Another story, also from Africa, offers a more optimistic perspective.
Striga, also called witch weed, is a parasitic plant that has a devastating effect
on corn harvests, particularly in fields planted by subsistence farmers in parts
of Africa.58 Every season, the infestation by Striga in affected fields becomes
worse, contributing to a downward spiral of poverty and food insecurity. 59 In
bad years, it can result in a one hundred percent crop loss.6" Striga affects
twenty to forty million hectares of farmland cultivated almost exclusively by
poor farmers in sub-Saharan Africa. 61 Striga seeds are very tiny. They are
carried by runoff, eroded soil, and easily contaminate other seeds. It is very
difficult to detect them and very difficult for resource-poor farmers to eradicate
them.
I want to emphasize the amount of damage Striga causes. It infects
almost eighty percent of farmland in western Africa, accounts for about an
estimated seven billion dollars in yield-related losses in sub-Saharan Africa
http://www.islamonline.net/servlet/Satellite?c=ArticleC&cid=l 157962476586&pagename=Zon
e-English-HealthScience%2FHSELayout.
54. Mugo et al., supra note 50, at 1493-1504.
55. Id. at 1494.
56. Id. This concern was based, in part, on Monsanto's attempt to block Argentina from
exporting Bt soybeans to Europe on the theory that the exported crops violated Monsanto's
European patent rights, even though Monsanto held no patent on the Bt soybeans in Argentina.
Soy Import Delayed as Argentina Fights Monsanto, (May 18, 2006) available at
http://www.foodproductiondaily.com/Supply-Chain/Soy-imports-delayed-as-Argentina-fights-
Monsanto-over-GM.
57. INT'L MAIZE & WHEAT IMPROVEMENT CENTER (CIMMYT), INSECT RESISTANT
MAIZE FOR AFRICA ANNUAL REPORT 2006, available at
http://www.cimmyt.org/english/wpp/gen-res/pdf/irmaAnnRep06.pdf.
58. INT'L MAIZE & WHEAT IMPROVEMENT CENTER (CIMMYT), STRIGA WEED CONTROL
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(remember these are subsistent farmers), and affects the livelihood of a
hundred million people.62 What Striga does is it attaches to the maize seed as
it germinates and sucks nutrients from the maize seed.63 There are existing
practices that can effectively control Striga. Unfortunately, they are not
practicable for subsistence farmers either because their benefit can only be
seen in the medium- or long-term but the techniques impose a significant,
immediate cost, or because they require a sophisticated understanding of a life
cycle of a plant which subsistence farmers often lack. There are also effective
pesticide treatments, but they tend to be very expensive. This is why Striga
causes the most problems for subsistence farmers; they are the ones without
the resources to respond to Striga infestations.
There is a new technology called StrigAway 64 that may change this sad
situation. StrigAway is an herbicide resistant com; it is not a genetically
modified organism, but it was produced by the use of modem biotechnology.
First, through mutagenesis, researchers developed a corn germplasm that is
resistant to an herbicide that kills Striga. Next, researchers developed a
technique to coat the com seeds with this herbicide. So the Striga seeds are
still in the soil, still germinate, and attach to the maize, but the maize seed is
coated in an herbicide that kills the Striga plant.65 The effects are dramatic.
This technology can increase yields by more than four times, and it is
extremely inexpensive.66 The cost-benefit ratio is probably greater than
twenty-five to one, and it is within the capacity of subsistence farmer to
implement and to purchase. 67 It is available this year. I am convinced this
technology is the beginning of a new dialogue, because it offers a clear
representation of how modem technology can, in fact, improve the lives of
subsistence farmers. This reality will change the contours of the discourse.
Another game-changing event: one of the side-effects of climate change is
drought. In the past, there was real criticism that, despite the rhetoric about
this technology, private research has spent very little time and money on
subsistence crops like cassava, and even less on problems like drought
resistance that were of direct concern to subsistence farmers. Drought is a
pressing and growing issue. Now, Monsanto thinks that it has some ability to
transform com to make genetically-modified corn that is more drought-
resistant. 68 That is a much bigger deal than adding Bt resistance. It is a much
62. Id; see also A. Oswald, Striga Control-Technologies and their Dissemination, 24 CROP
PROTECTION 333 (2005).
63. FORUM FOR ORGANIC RESOURCE MANAGEMENT, STRIGA EXTENSION TECHNOLOGY
REPORT, LONG RAINS 2008 REPORT 4-6 [hereinafter LONG RAINS 2008 REPORT], available at
http://www.aatf-africa.org/UserFiles/File/Striga2008report.pdf.
64. BASF, StrigAway Production Systems,
http://www.basfpublichealth.com/products/strigaway.html (last visited Apr. 30, 2009).
65. Id.
66. CIMMYT, STRIGA WEED CONTROL, supra note 59. For more detailed information
about the Striga trials, see also LONG RAINS 2008 REPORT, supra note 63.
67. CIMMYT, STRIGA WEED CONTROL, supra note 59.
68. Monsanto, Drought Tolerant Corn,
http://www.monsanto.comdroughttolerantcorn/default.asp (last visited Apr. 30, 2009);
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bigger deal than adding herbicide-resistance or even than combining the two.
We are no longer talking about adding a gene that is going to control a specific
trait. We are now talking about adding a gene that is going to reshape a
regulatory path. That is a much more significant change, involving a much
more fundamental alteration of the host plant. We are not there yet, but
Monsanto is confident enough about their progress that they are talking to the
New York Times about rolling out drought-resistant maize in the next couple
years.
6 9
Because drought resistance involves a much more complex alteration of
the plant, the consequences and repercussions for failure in terms of
stewardship are probably much more significant but so are the ramifications of
success. Right now Monsanto has partnered with the African-Agriculture
Technology Foundation, the Gates Foundation, and the Consultative Group on
International Agricultural Research in a project called Water Efficient Maize
for Africa (WEMA). 7 0 The goal is to develop drought-resistant maize for use
by small holders in germ plasma that is adapted to local environments. 71
The Striga and WEMA projects might radically change the terms of the
broader conversation about agricultural biotechnology. But, before that can
happen, we need to acknowledge the roots of the conflict and be honest about
how we got to the place we are in now.
So, what lessons can we draw from weaving together a more theoretical
exploration of trust with these technological developments? Some insights that
resonate in this context include the acknowledgement that public participation
is crucial, that public concerns are valid, and that purveyors and regulators of
the technology cannot afford to ignore the distribution of risks and benefits. I
want to emphasize that achieving sustainability in this area will involve
change. It will require a new, more inclusive dialogue that pays conscious
attention to the need to construct social trust. Above all, we cannot begin from
the position that other perspectives or other framings of the question are
illegitimate.
So, now let us put those propositions into concrete terms. In this room,
based on what I know about some of the people here and the conversations we
have had, it is clear that the anti-GMO rhetoric does not resonate much. So, I
am going to take the flaws in that rhetoric as a given and instead focus on the
flaws of the pro-GMO rhetoric. I am continually amazed about how close-
MONSANTO, DROUGHT TOLERANT CORN: EXCERPTS FROM R & D PIPELINE REVIEW (2008),
available at http://www.monsanto.com/pdf/droughttolerantcorn/drought-slides.pdf; see also
Andrew Pollack, Less Water, More Biotech: Drought Resistance is the Goal but Methods Differ,
N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 28, 2008).
69. Pollack, supra note 68.
70. African Agricultural Technology Foundation, Water-Efficient Maize for Africa,
http://www.aatf-africa.org/aatf-projects.phpsublevelone=30&subcat=5 (last visited Apr. 30,
2009).
71. Press Release, African Agricultural Technology Foundation, African Agricultural
Technology Foundation to Develop Drought-tolerant Maize Varieties for Small-scale Farmers in
Africa (Mar. 19, 2008), available at http://www.aatf-africa.org/newsdetail.php?newsid=95.
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minded this side of the debate can be. I cannot count the number of times I
have heard the objection "but the anti-GMO people are not rational. It is not
possible to engage in dialogue unless they abandon the absurd complaint that
" (Feel free to fill in the blank with your favorite complaint about
anti-GMO rhetoric.). Most often, the blank gets filled by the demand that, as a
precondition to conversation, GMO opponents abandon their contention that
GM-food is dangerous.
We need to step away from that mindset. We need to accept that there are
concerns that exist and that these concerns must be discussed in some fashion.
They need to be heard and considered. To coin a phrase, what I am suggesting
is that we need to "talk without preconditions." 72  That means you. That
means everybody. Every participant in the dialogue needs to open his or her
mind and his or her ears, not just the people on the other side. That does not
mean we have to credit magical thinking, but it does involve acknowledging
the legitimacy of the complaint that important questions, interests, and
concerns were shunted aside when the initial decisions were made about what
data to collect and how that data should be analyzed. No amount of reciting
data is going to resolve this problem.
We must confront the reality that the regulatory scheme for GM crops
was, either deliberately or accidentally (and it does not matter which),
structured to avoid engaging in the concerns that matter to many people. GM
advocates are very resistant to this reality. The responses from GM advocates
almost uniformly point out that the GM opponents' knowledge is invariably
idiosyncratic, limited, and quite often wrong.73 Based on that concern, the
EPA has spent two decades focusing on expert concern, rather than public
concern. 74  I am not disputing that lay concerns can by idiosyncratic and
wrong. I just want to suggest that expert knowledge is also limited and quite
often wrong.
75
Proponents of the technology must accept that the exciting potential
embodied in biotechnology will never be realized unless we have a
72. During the 2008 presidential campaign, there was much discussion of Democratic
Candidate Barack Obama's professed willingness to talk with Iran without preconditions. Upon
taking office, one of the first things President Obama did was reiterate that position. See, e.g.,
Julian Borger, Barack Obama: Administration Willing to Talk to Iran "Without Preconditions,"
GUARDIAN, Jan.21, 2009, available at http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jan/21/barack-
obama-iran-negotiations.
73. A great example of the truth in this position comes from the 2002 Eurobarameter survey
where people were asked to agree or disagree with the statement "ordinary tomatoes do not
contain genes, while genetically-modified tomatoes do." You would be amazed with how many
people agreed with that statement.
74. Press Release, Envtl. Prot. Agency, Reducing Risk: Setting Priorities and Strategies for
Environmental Protection (Sept. 26, 1990), available at
http://www.epa.gov/history/topics/risk/0 I.htm.
75. Sheila Jasanoff, Technologies of Humility: Citizen Participation in Governing Science,
41 MINERVA 223-44 (2003); Brian Wynne, Seasick on the Third Wave? Subverting the
Hegemony of Propositionalism. Response to Collins & Evans 33 SOC. STUD. Sci. 401(2002).
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comprehensive and scientifically rigorous regulatory system that not only
ensures environmental and human health issues are adequately addressed but
also ensures that these questions are raised and addressed in a fashion that is
credible to the public. We do not currently have such a regulatory system.
Protecting the public's interest in this context will require government to
assume a far more active role than the hands-off attitude that has been the
hallmark of conventional agricultural policy.
The 2008 United States' presidential election was a watershed moment
for revitalizing public discourse about trust. We have a widely gyrating stock
market; we have a war begun by falsified evidence; and we have regulatory
failures that brought us the sub-prime mortgage meltdown as well as tainted
baby food, cough syrup and toys. The public is left wondering and, for the
first time in a long time, is discussing what it means to have trust in regulation.
We are at a moment when we can actually have this conversation and I think
we need to. To do that, we need to think seriously about trust, and we need to
let go of polarizing rhetoric and to resist the temptation to demonize those who
differ with us. We must to move beyond polarization if we are to continue to
thrive on our shrinking, warming planet.
